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One of the attributes Italo Calvino recommends for writing in the coming millennium 
is lightness, a provision whose purpose is to clear away the obscurity of the world 
and to prevent our being crushed by matter, by chaos or by tradition. Lightness is 
not the same as simplicity, but it is similar. Nor does it, in this case, have the same 
type of outcome as the struggle between darkness and light or, more recently, 
between ancient and modern. They are different things, since gravitas is not a sign 
of the past, but one which is dominant in all centuries and all places. Poetry is the 
antidote, hence its purgative character. And what about science? Calvino bows 
down before this venerable icon, and admits that no human undertaking has been 
so efficient, so methodically and institution-ally efficient, in the effort to scrape the 
accumulated grime from things and to create the illusion that we can not only 
understand it but even control it and then possess it.100 
Our relationship with science is ever-changing. No-one disputes its enormous 
powers of seduction, nor its undeniable ability to buoy up hopes. For centuries our 
cultural imagery has been full of images produced by this inexhaustible factory of 
dreams. It would seem that its ideal is self-sufficiency, the conquest of all types of 
knowledge and free unlimited movement. And so it becomes a historical 
undertaking which is more and more independent, versatile and mobile.101 Most 
people trust in its practicability, but many more have misgivings. There is a 
lightness in science which is associated to its closeness to the mysteries of the 
world, and it is hard not to yield to its appearance of truthfulness, honesty, 
freedom, altruism, solidarity and even beauty. But while it is sorting out all our 
problems and putting the pieces back in order, it is be-coming more and more 
remote from the people, from the ordinary world. And finally we all find ourselves 
pushed to the shore of a vast savage continent.102 
 
 
                                            
100 Italo Calvino, Seis propuestas para el próximo milenio. Ediciones Siruela, Madrid, 1989. 
101 Bruno Latour, Science in action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA: 1973. 
102 See Bertrand Labasse, Observations on the Communication of Scientific and Technological 
Knowledge, Reportto Directorate-General XII of the European Comission, 1999. AIso, Alan Irwin, 
Citizen Science, a study of People, Expertise and Sustainable Development, Routledge, London, 
1995. 
Illusions of the two cultures 
On the 8th of May 1794, three months before the downfall of Robespierre, Lavoisier 
was beheaded. The sentence was carried out after he had been refused 
permission to finish some experiments which would otherwise have been left 
incomplete. The answer from the appeal court was brief: 
"La République n'a pas besoin de savants". From that moment on we have had a 
perfect symbol to reflect on the difficult historical relation-ships between the two 
republics - the republic of letters and that of politicians. And the circumstances 
surrounding the case are captivating: for example, the presence of the guillotine, 
Joseph-Ignace Guillotin's dreadful new technique, invented at the request of the 
National Assembly to ease the work of the executioner, overwhelmed by the 
enormous number of condemned prisoners swelling the prison population.103 
Surely what is most striking is the judge's brutal and absurd reply, because the 
Republic wanted to be enlightened and to set itself up as a structure capable of 
exercising rational control over the social and natural world. It was not an easy 
decision to close down the Académie des Sciences, but it was justified by the need 
to impose upon scientific institutions a form of democratic control more committed 
to the needs of the nation.104 Science, as the tiresome rhetoric of the day declared, 
was no longer an end in itself but an instrument of the new bourgeois state. Not 
that the revolutionaries invented the argument of the usefulness of science: the 
argument is as old as knowledge itself, and traces of it can be found as far back as 
the times of Archimedes. But what was novel now was the central role which the 
new rhetorical and practical politics gave to the scientists and the institutions. 
Suffice it to recall the impressive list of mathematicians, astronomers, engineers 
and physicists who carne to power after the French Revolution: Carnot led the 
Committee of Public Safety, Monge commanded the Navy, Bailly headed the City 
Council of Paris until he was guillotined, Laplace was a senator, Fourier a prefect, 
and Arago became a minister. A Geometrician, Bonaparte, seized civil and military 
power.105 
The words that condemned Lavoisier confirm that what the Republic needed, in its 
role as representative of the people, was good republicans; and that, as a result, 
no branch of knowledge and no scholar could remain outside the control of the new 
democratic power. 
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The situation in 1800 represented a turning-point. The road ahead was the right 
one, but ¡t was full of obstacles. If we look at Tocqueville, the Frenchman who in 
1831 travelled round the young American republic, marvelling at the enormous 
differences he found on either side of the Atlantic, we see someone who laments 
the lack of liberty in Europe and who unequivocally denounces the oligarchic 
nature of the French institutions. r-le was doubtless aware of the existence of the 
École Polytechnique and of the Musée d'Histoire Naturelle, perhaps the greatest 
concentrations of talent then existing in the world, but he deplores their élitist 
organisation. What makes America different is its fascination with utilitarianism: the 
ability to link technical knowledge to everyday needs, ensuring for the people a 
level of well-being and consumption unheard of in the Old Continent. And this is 
the crux of his comparison, for it unites the spirit of practicality with democracy.106 
Something in this analysis reminds us of another, equally well-known: that of 
Voltaire and his exile in London. For Voltaire what explained the cultural and 
scientific hegemony of England and Holland was the development of trade and the 
generalisation of comfort, as a new social value alongside citizenship. The 
comparison between the severity of some and the tolerance of others ended in his 
scathing criticisms of European monarchies. The subject, as we can see, is an old 
one and, although its form changes, there was always an influential current of 
opinion in favour of a causal relation between tolerance and learning, and between 
democracy and science. For Tocqueville and the many intellectuals who carne 
after him the civilising equation was simple: individual liberties encourage practical 
knowledge, leading to cheaper production and a better standard of living. The 
formula is completed with another idealisation which sees the citizens in the middle 
of a mechanised utopia, part of a system which guarantees the combination of 
collective happiness and individual wellbeing.107 And the more technology, the 
greater the wealth and the more democracy. Very naïve, no doubt, but this was 
how they presented the tale of the little milkmaid defending liberalism and 
progress. We now have a huge range of examples with which to criticise such 
naïveté, or rather such utilitarian and industrial optimism. And although we are well 
aware of the cases of the former Soviet Union and the majority of Asian countries 
(such as China, India, Japan or Pakistan), the fact is that we are faced with a 
successful ideology which still has many followers, even in positions of political 
responsibility. 
The awareness of the power of science is not new. But it never reached such 
sublime heights as in the middle of the 19th century. And we are not just thinking of 
its military and industrial applications, but its more broadly cultural aspect. We are 
talking about the religion of progress which not only promised more efficient 
machines and panaceas for all ills, but the very vision of a truth revealed and not 
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inherited. While positivism gained followers and organised spectacular propaganda 
coups, like the Universal Exhibitions which drew huge crowds —the Paris 
Exhibition of 1900 attracted some 50 million visitors— the first misgivings began to 
be felt. Machines, once seen by the working class as a threat to the stability of their 
Jobs, stopped burning. They would be worshipped by the masses now that they 
had been won over to the cause of progress.108 Some intellectuals, however, were 
not so easily seduced and they imagined new dangers: Frankenstein is the symbol 
of this new trend. But who was this character? Most people would reply that it was 
a fictional monster created by Mary Shelley, and the subject of a host of films. 
Some may even remember that its deformation was due to a sudden electrical 
failure seconds before the corpse on which experiments were being done carne 
back to life. And, finally, there will be the vague image of a nightmarish laboratory, 
the horrified people, or the innocence of a little girl who is not frightened off by the 
difference of aesthetic values. But no. Frankenstein was the doctor who thought up 
the experiment, and not the result of the operations. It is strange, is it not, this 
transfer of identity between the subject of the action to the object he creates. 
Clearly, here is a novel which invites us to think about the dangers of this new 
emerging power which science represents. But the cultural turmoil is not caused by 
the results, since the risk lies in certain irresponsible scientists who unleash forces 
or processes which later they cannot, or will not, control.109 Mary Shelley seems to 
be saying to her readers that some scientists may be-come perverted, even by 
their own stupidity. But what the people, the public, remember is less high-minded, 
and it is scientific activity itself which bears the stigma. And this is one of the key 
arguments of the theory of two cultures, for while scientists "carry the future in their 
bones", traditional intellectuals such as Yeats, Pound and, for example, OrweII, 
were accused by Snow of being born Luddites: deaf to the good news of science 
and blind to technical progress. All the same it is interesting that the sect of the 
reactionaries, initially formed by laymen of the industrial and urban working class, 
should grow, according to Snow, to include the humanists a hundred years later.110 
The shadows which began to appear in this 19th century literature become 
predominant in the rupturist works of Wells, for whom the novum announced by 
science is not a machine paradise but a night-mare in which beings from other 
worlds or devastating wars drag Humanity back to early brutish stages of their 
evolution. In Wells the story is normally built around an unexpected superhuman 
force which must be fought by the selfless and philanthropic hero, free of the usual 
self-righteousness and self-satisfaction, and who has to resist this disastrous 
biological regression towards destruction. In this sense all of Wells' work is an 
argument against the mindless Victorian society and against the arrogant and 
diabolical scientist, capable of unleashing forces which he then cannot control. 
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With it comes the end of the brilliant certainties of Newtonian physics, and we 
begin to see terrible portents of wars between worlds, genetic alchemy or 
evolutionary accidents. 
This is the world which will slowly come to dominate in the literature of our century. 
Socialist paradises, described by William Morris and others, enlightened by 
socially-conscious and generous scientists, are replaced in films like Fritz Lang's 
Metropolis or novels like Aldous Huxley's Brave New World by oppressive societies 
inhabited by robots or beings with no memory, manipulated by pseudo-
Prometheuses promising happiness at the expense of freedom. While novels and 
the cinema soon began to be wary of science, and advised caution against the 
Faustian myth, throughout this century public opinion on science and technology 
has kept a basically ambivalent attitude where, in the words of Marcel LaFollette: 
"The message appears clear: science gives, and science takes away".111 
Without a shadow of doubt the most wide-spread stereotype in popular culture is 
the mad scientist, the evil being who —for the most varied of reasons— wants to 
dominate the world or, failing that, to destroy it with the amazing powers that his 
knowledge bestows upon him.112 Innumerable versions of this Faustian figure fill 
the pages of as many comics and popular novels, as well as the pictures of 
countless films and TV series. In all of these media the scientist's only role seems 
to be that of an opponent to the hero, and his intrinsic wickedness (or in other 
variations, his access to special powers which finally get out of control) separate 
him from the popular image of the typical man in the street with which one could 
perhaps identify. But, even without taking into account this extreme case —albeit 
the most typical in popular culture— other more neutral or even positive depictions 
of scientists also underline this difference from what is implicitly considered normal. 
Who could forget Sinclair Lewis' magnificent and idealised description in his 
famous Doctor Arrowsmith, one of the masterpieces of the genre in question? "h-le 
had never lunched with a duchess, never received an award, he had never been 
interviewed, never done anything the public could understand nor, since his 
school-boy crushes, had he ever had any experience which people might consider 
romantic. He was, indeed, a true scientist". A description which recreates and 
updates the image par excellence of the isolation of the scientist from his social 
environment, a legend which winds throughout all the historiography based on the 
Big Picture. 
Between the case of Lavoisier and the others we have mentioned, there is one 
major difference. In the nineteenth century mistrust grew up like the myth of Faust. 
And although Jonathan Swift, too, in Gulliver's Travels distances himself from 
scientific fashion, his criticism is no more than irony towards certain types of 
pedantry. Swift is irritated by the petulance of the scholar, but he still does not 
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accuse him of arrogance. Which is exactly what Dumas, the judge who sentenced 
Lavoisier, was to do later. And so the conflict between science and politics now 
takes the form of a certain tension between scientists and humanists, which 
disguises what the public sees and remembers: that is, the split between elite and 
popular culture.113 
 
 
The misanthropy of the scholar 
 
It was not always so. In earlier times, when there was still no clear distinction 
between a philosopher, a politician, an engineer or an astronomer, there was no 
tension between people of the Arts and those of Science. The roles alternated, 
since a good intellectual had to be a jack of many trades, unless he was prepared 
to renounce the idea that every-thing was the expression of one unique principle, 
that every part of the Universe could only be understood as a microcosm; that is, 
that each individual thing contained everything within it, being no more than a 
specific reflection of one great universal harmony. In the centuries to which we 
refer the essential tension was between learned and laymen, between the 
refinement of the elitist culture and the barbarism rife among servants and 
peasants, and which also affected practically all public officials, soldiers and clergy. 
And we have three stories to tell in order to illustrate this change. We cannot 
reconstruct them documentally, be-cause, as in Lavoisier's case, they deal with 
things which everyone knows but which never actually happened. They are 
historic, but there were no witnesses. And, of course, we know so much about 
them that they are more real and more relevant than most of what we find in history 
books. They are real myths and give off the rosy glow of dawn: they are founding 
myths. And here they are. First we shall talk of Galileo's EPPUR si MUOVE, then of 
Archimedes' EUREKA and, finally, of the laughter of the Thracian woman, the story 
of the well of Thales of Miletus. 
The bare facts of the legend about the difficulties of Copernicanism can be quickly 
told.114 Galileo has just renounced his Copernican beliefs before the Inquisitional 
court. He is more angry than frightened, and between his teeth he mutters Eppur si 
muove, And yet it moves. What has happened? The greatest courtier, the most 
outstanding scientist, the greatest prose-writer in the Italian language has 
misjudged his strength, and against the advice of friends and enemies he has not 
recanted in time. He knows that the Earth moves round the Sun and declares that 
he has proved it. He fights to the end, but finally realises that torture and maybe 
even death at the stake await him. His judges are not prepared to negotiate, and 
obstinately they all turn up for this fascinating appointment with fate. They are 
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making history, they are going to humiliate Galileo and the astronomer, former 
friend of the powerful, shining star of the Florentine court of the Medicis, confidant 
of popes and cardinals, is on his knees reading a text which they have prepared for 
him.: 
 
I, Galileo Galilei, [...] seventy years of age [...] and kneeling before you [...] 
swear that I have always believed and now believe, and with the help of God 
shall always believe in all that which the Holy Catholic Apostolic Roman 
Church holds to be true, preaches and teaches [...] Insofar as I have written 
and caused to be printed a book in which I expound this condemned 
doctrine [...] With sincere spirit and true faith I abjure all my errors, and reject 
and abominate them... 
 
And this is what the documents show. But the story does not end there because 
somebody at some time explained that Galileo, as proud as ever, muttered 
between his teeth the phrase which fits in so well with our need for myths. "Yet it 
moves" resounds in our collective imagination like a rebel cry against Church's 
authoritarianism, as a gesture meant to remind us of superiority of scientific reason 
over the reasons of state, a sublime affirmation of individual freedom against social 
conventions. How could we fail to identify these words of rage as ours, still bursting 
with emotion? These are "facts" which we manufacture through necessity and 
which give dignity to our ever-threatened human condition. 
But let us go back a little. The extensive historiography about Galileo available —
some 5 000 titles—, seems to confirm the theory that his misfortune was due to his 
Copernican convictions, but that the basic motive was something else. His 
enemies, the Jesuits, managed to persuade the Supreme Pontiff that the character 
Simplicio who appeared in the Dialogues was a caricature of the Pope of Rome. 
The evidence was elusive, as indirect and shaky as that adduced by Galileo in 
defence of the movement of the Earth, but the tense atmosphere made it credible. 
And from that moment, the die was cast. For the argument ceased to be about 
astronomy or theology, to become instead a crude exercise of power aimed at 
discouraging anyone who imagined that political power should be subject to 
scientific authority. Furthermore, since Simplicio spoke like an ordinary man, 
putting forward all the common sense arguments, the trial in a sense dramatises a 
revolt of laymen against scholars. It is not clear who was the first to tell this story, 
but there is a version which adds a surprising new character: it was to his dog that 
he addressed his Eppur si muove.115 This may seem absurd, and indeed it is. But, 
as we have said, it is not a matter of justifying one version or an-other, but of 
extracting the cultural consequences. It seems that in this context we are being told 
that even dogs, unprejudiced brutes creatures, could understand him better. 
Galileo's conviction, like Lavoisier's later, meant his immediate promotion to divine 
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status. His disciples fabricated his biography, insofar as it includes other inventions 
which are no less significant and widely-known.116 For example, his birth certificate 
was forged to show that he carne into the world on the day after the death of the 
great Michelangelo. It was also considered a fact that he had climbed to the top of 
the Tower of Pisa to drop two spheres of different weight which reached the bottom 
at the same time, thus destroying Aristotelian physics. But nobody has ever found 
a document proving the existence of this farnous and crucial experiment. And we 
could go on, because the greater the myths, the better embroidered are the 
narratives describing them. 
The jump we now make takes us to Sicily, nineteen centuries before. We are in the 
third century BC to talk about Archimedes.117 We know very little of his biography, 
and almost all of it would fit into a few lines. Born in 287 BC, son of a rich patrician 
astronomer, he lived for 75 years until 212 BC His fame, like Galileo's, is legendary 
and also like the Pisan he maintained close relationships with those in power. 
Archimedes was a sort of palace counsellor of the tyrant Hieron II of Syracuse. His 
death was a martyrdom, although he was killed by human stupidity rather than 
hate. Liceus, Plutarch, Valerius and Maximus, among others, tell that at the end of 
the lengthy siege of Syracuse ordered by the Roman Consul Marcellus our sage 
was in the garden of his house (others say he was on the beach) resolving an 
intricate geometrical problem whose lines he had drawn in the sand. Then a 
Roman soldier trod on his "manuscript", enraging the scientist. And that was that: 
at one blow the vulgar soldier ended the man's life and turned him into a myth. 
Once again we have the struggle between the scholar and the layman, and once 
again ignorance prevails by brute force over genius. And everyone was deeply 
sorry, because the Consul had ordered his troops to respect the scholar. This is no 
mere detail, because the chronicles tell that Archimedes invented some 
engineering devices which delayed the end of the siege and seriously annoyed the 
invading troops. They talk of marvels such as colossal catapults or a system of 
mirrors capable of concentrating light on the sails of ships and setting them alight. 
Much has been written of these marvels, but we have no choice, we have to say 
that they are fictional. Seven centuries later Procius finds another gem to delight 
the believers. We do not know where he found it, but who would dare to say ¡t was 
false? The Archimedes he shows us is the greatest of magicians, and he 
addresses the king: "Give me but one firm spot on which to stand, and I will move 
the earth". Fantastic! So they ask him to demonstrate this stroke of genius. Then 
after many calculations and much hard work he builds a gigantic system of pulleys 
and out of the water he drags the 5/racuse, a three-masted ship of some fifty feet 
in length, full of cargo. What more could they ask for? All the crowd stood open-
mouthed as they watched the amazing spectacle: science could dominate nature 
or, in other words, the control of science gave great power. 
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And the best is yet to come. Once again we have Hieron II —power is still at centre 
stage— and our man. This time the problem is nothing to do with matters of war, 
but with the court. The King —recounts the great Vitruvius— has received a crown 
and suspects that all that glisters is not gold. What is more, he is convinced that he 
has been cheated with an alloy which is an offence to his dignity. He goes to 
Archimedes for help, who racks his brain to find a way of solving the enigma 
without destroying the symbol. In the next scene we see him in a bath full of water 
which overflows as he gets ¡n. What could be more normal? Perhaps, but it is all 
Archimedes needs. Eureka! I've got it! he is said to have shouted, running naked 
down the street. He had discovered the famous Archimedes' principle, where a 
body submerged in water experiences a vertical upwards force equal to the weight 
of water displaced. It would then be possible to construct a hydrostatic scale and 
check whether the crown displaced the same amount of water as if it was of pure 
gold. He built ¡t and confirmed the suspicions. While there was much merit in doing 
so, it is only fair to say that it is always easier to prove what "is already known" 
than the opposite. This is where Galileo went wrong before a court which "already 
knew" what was true, however much some-of the evidence might point in another 
direction.. The Simplicio of this story is no longer in disguise, nor is he a parody of 
anybody. This time it is the people who witness the scholar's eccentric behaviour, 
the unsettling evidence of genius. The nudity in which the discovery ¡s clothed is 
important, and the subliminal message is clear: a scientist only needs his brain, all 
the rest is incidental. And there is another exciting thing about this story: the 
overwhelming joy, the unbounded satisfaction. And as nothing is comparable to the 
pleasure of discovery, we get the explosion of glee with which he runs through 
streets before the once more astonished citizens of Syracuse. 
A bathtub is all that it needed. War, ships, these are overcomplicated affairs. But 
science is simple. It is very difficult, it is the province of the chosen few, but a great 
discovery only needs great curiosity. It ¡s the same as the story of Newton's apple, 
another doubtful fact which has been handed down to us by tradition and which we 
cannot prove.118 It was his niece who claimed to have been a witness, and she 
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went around telling the story until it finally reached the ears of Voltaire, who was 
able to play "Vitruvius" and to make up a good story. What both cases have in 
common is that a genius converts a vulgar and commonplace event into a far-
reaching scientific fact. These two myths are telling us that a scholar is someone 
very special who can put everything to use, whose sight and sensitivity are very far 
from ordinary. He is different; he lives among us but he sees other things. His 
world and ours are the same only in outward appearance. 
Let us get back into our time-machine and call at Miletus. It is the end of the sixth 
century BC and Thales, for the Greeks one of the seven great sages of antiquity, 
founder of Philosophy and astronomy, goes out of his house to look at the sky. 
Absorbed in his thoughts he doesn't see the well which is in his way, and he 
plunges to the bottom. Plato tells us the story through the mouth of Socrates; the 
only witness is his Thracian servant, an ignorant woman and, like all Thracians, 
obsessed by the worship of her many gods. And Thales had just the opposite 
obsession because in his opinion there were too many gods in the minds of his 
contemporaries. It was enough for him to open his eyes in that harbour town to be 
convinced that everything carne from water, that water was the primordial element 
at the origin of everything that exists. And so was born philosophy, for it was 
Thales who had the distinction of first looking for the reason of things in nature and 
not in the capricious world of the gods. And again, as in the case of Newton and 
Archimedes, his discovery was a response to the simplicity of the formulas which 
                                                                                                                                     
second attributing it to a woman who never returned to Europe and who had done no more than to 
admit that the natives might possess more effective medicines than the palace doctors. So who 
made the discovery? The legendary Inca, the Countess in the fable or the historical botanist who 
transformed a series of mistakes into a famous breakthrough? 
No mistake had greater consequences than the discovery, accidental finding, or invention of 
America, which at all events has been called the Columbian breakthrough. Columbus was looking 
for the Indies and found America and, as such, deserved to be included as yet another character in 
Walpole's tale "The Three Princes of Serendip". Archimedes and Newton were enjoying a rest when 
something pulled them out of the everyday run of things and raised them to the status of 
discoverers. We remember jenner for discovering smallpox inoculation and he relates the story that 
a simple milkmaid told him that she would never catch such a virulent disease because she has had 
already the cowpox —vaccinia. The story was remembered years later and became the origin of the 
methodical research programme which the scientist carried out until the discovery was made. Once 
again we have a day-to-day fact becoming a scientific breakthrough. In the same way, many stories 
have circulated about the discovery of penicillin by Fleming, rubber vulcanisation by Goodyear, the 
Rosetta stone by Champollion, radioactivity by Becquerel, or the positron by Anderson. Chance is a 
common factor in all these cases, although it is highly debatable whether they may rightly be 
attributed to common or garden luck or to prestigious serendipity. Certainly, to say that luck was 
important gives a certain aura to the scientist, as shown in the case of the discovery of benzene, a 
molecule which chemists could not understand. The story that Kekulé told thirty years later turned 
out to be a fraudulent lie, since he said that he dreamt that a snake coiled round itself, which 
enabled him to devise the hexagonal form. But it was not true, since it was then shown that he had 
not been inspired by dreams but by reading the work of his predecessors. For more tales, see Sven 
Ortoli and Nicolás Witkowski, La baignoire d'Arquiméde, Seuil, Paris: 1996, and aiso Federico di 
Trocchio, Las mentiras de la ciencia. ¿Por qué y cómo engañan los científicos?, Alianza Editorial, 
Madrid: 1995. 
led to success, and also has its origins in his curiosity about things which could 
happen, about his surroundings, about everyday things. 
But what part does this woman play in the story? She is there to laugh; the servant 
mocks the fact that someone looking so far above him fails to notice what is at his 
feet: if you look at the sky, you are unaware of the ground. The Thracian woman 
not only evokes the intellectuals' loss of a sense of reality, but she reproaches 
them for their lack of concern for worldly things —perhaps even their disdain for 
popular religious beliefs— and for the concerns of ordinary folk. Plato tells us a 
fable, probably borrowed from Aesop, which is far from innocent, since Thales' 
action anticipated what was to become normal in Socrates, and which finally 
became intolerable to the Greek polis. Scholars interfered in their affairs, 
questioning everything, rummaging around their refined traditions, and rather than 
the solution they were the real problem faced by the fragile social structure. If 
Thales was a victim, Socrates ended as a martyr. The myth has been told a 
thousand times and changed as often. Its shadow stretches as far as our own time, 
because the accusation that the philosopher is a waste of time and a social 
parasite is a platitude which is far from exhausted, even though he was born at the 
same time as astronomy. And there are versions for all tastes: Montaigne brands 
the Thracian woman as the enemy of knowledge because she did nothing to 
prevent his fall, Serres angrily asserts that the well was none other than an 
astronomical observatory and that the scientist was working down there, something 
which the coarse servant was unable to understand.119 
But there is another story worth recalling. Aristotle recounts that Thales was very 
angry because people laughed at him for being so poor, even though he was so 
wise. More laughter. And in order to disabuse his fellow-citizens he offered them 
proof that his situation was voluntary and not imposed. His knowledge of 
astronomy enabled him to forecast a splendid olive harvest, and he then rented all 
the mills in order to organise a monopoly from which he could speculate and make 
fat profits. He did so and then got rid of all the wealth he had made. Scholars have 
no time for trivia, and if they seem shabby or idle, it is not because they hate the 
world or cannot enjoy life, but because no passion is the equal of passion for 
knowledge, and no success so great as that of discovery. 
Who has the last laugh? In other words, who can afford to laugh at whom? 
Scholars or laymen? Let us leave the answer for a moment, and not fall into the 
trap lurking behind such apparently innocent questions. The problem we pose is an 
old one, but what our wise guests are talking about is right up-to-date, problems 
yet to be solved. Thales and Archimedes are still alive, but we have to resume our 
journey. And from most ancient to most modern times. Barely a second passes 
and we are back with Snow, who in 1959 wrote a book whose success is still a 
mystery to many of us. Snow says that the West is rushing headlong towards a 
terrible crisis. The problem is the communication gap between the two cultures —
traditional or literary and liberal or positivist— a tragedy which threatens the very 
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idea of democracy and which, if true, would be bemoaned by all the Tocquevilles 
travelling round America. The solution he proposes is simple, and consists in 
fusing into a single, third, culture knowledge of nature and knowledge of 
conscience, common speech with learned language. Snow, like Frank 
Oppenheimer before him with his paradigmatic popularising project in the San 
Francisco Exploratorium, disappointed like his brother Robert by the circum-
stances surrounding the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, wants better 
republicans, citizens involved in culture and science. And for this he seeks an army 
of intermediaries to build a bridge between the two shores. 
At the end of the Second World War Vannevar Bush, Director of the Federal Office 
for Science and Technology, president of the Carnegie Foundation and former 
architect of the Manhattan project, published a text entitled Science: the Endless 
Frontier to remind politicians and citizens that America's strength lay in its capacity 
for scientific and technical innovation.120 And this enthusiasm continued unabated 
until the Soviets overtook them in the space race. Then began the drama and the 
Americans suffered an identity crisis: they could not believe, ¡t was absurd, that the 
Communists, in the typical language of the cold war, could go forward more quickly 
in the march to progress. And among the many diagnoses of this supposed 
decadence that of Snow, pointing out the tragedy of the two cultures, gained 
credibility. And thus arose the myth. However, our opinion differs, for the problem 
continues to be the gulf between scholars and laymen, or between the elite and the 
people. 
 
 
Popular Scientists 
 
We have already quoted Voltaire who, for Snow, would have personified the 
paradigm of the intellectual bridge and who, as is well-known, played an important 
part in the introduction of Newtonianism into France. The publication of his 
Elements de Philosophie de Newton was praised unreservedly by the Jesuits 
themselves, his old teachers : "Behold, all that which seemed difficult or 
impenetrable in Newton is here, how-ever, within our grasp... Everyone wishes to 
read at least a chapter, to glance at the titles, to feast their eyes upon the book [...] 
/e tout Paris is buzzing with the name of Newton, is prattling about Newton, is 
studying and understanding Newton".121 
Lo and behold, the dilemma of the two cultures is apparently resolved. A man of 
letters, the Poet of France, explains science to all, and nobody who aspires to be 
enlightened can be unfamiliar with Newton. Sir Peter Medawar, winner of the Nobel 
Prize for medicine, protested two centuries later that not reading Shakespeare was 
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tantamount to being an ignoramus, whereas total ignorance of the theory of 
relativity was still forgiven. In the eighteenth century, however, to talk of the theory 
of gravity or the refraction of light through prisms was the frontier which had to be 
passed before entering the salons of Madame de Pompadour or Madame de 
Châtelet.122 The dream of science within everyone's reach seemed to have come 
true, and was the precursor of such astounding facts as the Great Exhibitions or 
the Cité des Sciences et de 1'lndustrie de la Villette in Paris. 
And so runs the well-established propaganda, concealing a reality which is not 
quite so obvious. How did the grim Mr. Newton reach the hearts of all these wise 
ladies? Voltaire had to invent the genre of popularisation. The facts articulating his 
tale of mathematical laws and principles of physics are no more than a collection of 
anecdotes which, by being entangled with everyday events, mean a new way of 
expressing collective experience and thus common sense. And when he could not 
find the right metaphor he did what has always been done: he re-sorted to the 
authority of the divine Newton and asked his reader for an act of faith... When he 
does not know what to say he attacks Descartes and rather than prove the dictum 
of the new science he ridicules the principles of the old. He contrasts the absurdity 
of the Cartesian ether with the simplicity of the vacuum, and always with a rhetoric 
which creates the illusion that Descartes was cunning and Newton straightforward. 
It is absurd to admit the concept of action-at-a-distance, but his rhetoric was 
successful. Voltaire knew that it was impossible to become Newtonian without an 
act of faith and so he asked help from his friend Maupertuis in the following forceful 
and revealing terms: "I await your reply to know whether or not I should believe in 
attraction [...] My faith will depend on you". And a few days later, after receiving the 
reply, he writes back enthusiastically: "You have banished my doubts... Behold, I 
am a Newtonian like yourself. I am your disciple and I put my profession of faith in 
your hands".123 There is no doubt. Voltaire, who knew little of science, needed to 
be converted. This is the trap into which anyone trying to enlighten the ignorant will 
fall. Science, intended as an activity for privileged brains, is spread to the ignorant 
using a style which needs the literary wiles of a great seducer. 
Voltaire was great, but Georges-Louis Leclerc, Conde de Buffon, was in no way 
inferior. Author of the monumental 90-volume Natural History and a sworn enemy 
of Voltaire, he proposes other ways to understand the relation between science 
and public.124 The change, however, demands a new approach. And again we 
have the same rhetoric which always tries to ally itself with common sense. Is it not 
absurd, says Buffon, that the dog, which "...customarily follows the horse in real 
life", should appear, according to Linnaeus, immediately before the horse in his 
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system of zoological classification? The Creator cannot be a Great Geometrician, 
as Voltaire had it, but a Sublime Gardener who has ordered nature in accordance 
with what we are and, of course, what we could be. But this "we" to whom Buffon 
addresses his words is not the thinking logos of Descartes and Newton, but the 
collective subject which emerges as spokesman of public opinion. Buffon's Natural 
History re-quires a radical expansion of the sensory universe, capable of "follow-
ing... the order of relationships which things seem to have to have with us". Rather 
than create complicated systems of classification it is more important to "look and 
look again". Not such an easy task, unless we can open our eyes to look as if for 
the first time. In order to know nature, we have to shake off a heavy inheritance: we 
have to be re-born, or invent a new res publica to restore our atrophied sensitivity. 
And the battle must be fought in the field of public opinion, without whose 
expansion there can be neither civil history nor natural history. 
Buffon then appears as the awaited prophet, he comes to fulfill a long-deferred 
promise: the creation of popular science. Not elitist and then popularised, but 
totally woven into the warp of society and, nevertheless, endorsed by Royal 
Privilege or authorised by the Academy of Sciences of Paris. Buffon represents the 
possibility that the knowledge of nature, of its order and distribution, its culture as is 
generation, may be ours by right. And the French love him. His books were bought 
with great delight, until they became the greatest publishing success of all time. 
Yes, they love him because his rejection of a mechanical-geometric concept of 
nature opens the way to new ways of understanding within the grasp of the 
ordinary intellect. There is a direct contact between the scientist and the public 
which does not need the intervention of the intellectual. The strength of his Natural 
History lies precisely in his ability to address the reader directly, without a need for 
go-betweens, and to teach him that there is no more order in nature than we our-
selves want to find in it. Thus the reader takes a decisive role. The knowledge 
described by Buffon avoids the simplifications introduced by all the other systems 
and, without scorching biological diversity with abstract laws, takes as much 
pleasure in feeling it as in reading about it. The history of Nature cannot be 
excluded from the history of the ways in which we feel it and therefore write about 
it. 
If Voltaire and his scheme of popularisation can be seen as the realisation of the 
dreams of Snow, Oppenheimer or Medawar, Buffon seems to embody Brockman's 
aspirations. In what may be considered the manifesto of "The emerging third 
culture", John Brockman declares that the scientists of the third culture 
communicate directly with the public, without need of philosophers or popularisers, 
and so acquire their status as the new public intellectuals.125 They call Daniel 
Dennett the new Bertrand Russell, Tom Wolfe describes Edward O. Wilson as the 
new Darwin, and Richard Dawkins is now one of the most sought-after writers in 
Great Britain. Science is posing challenges which affect the fundamental values of 
our social order and which involve the very survival of the species. People have 
been seduced by this message and now they demand that these tensions should 
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be brought into the open. And Brockman, who has read the signs of the times, 
confirms that "his" authors, converted into sexy scientists, have at least a tenth as 
many readers as those who follow the writings of the Pope. So, as well as being a 
great propaganda exercise, the third culture is also a big business which nobody is 
quite sure how to interpret.126 
What characterises the science produced by this third culture is its ability to create 
objects which were previously unthinkable within the traditional scientific world. It is 
not just that we are talking of problems of an interdisciplinary nature made up of a 
greater number of variables, nor that they need any greater understanding of 
chance as a motor for change, nor even that they include theories relating to 
human consciousness or behaviour: but it is the combination of all these difficulties 
which make them unmanageable. Not all problems are automatically accessible. 
Each discipline has its traditions, and its own way of reducing phenomena to 
observable and quantifiable parameters. So to pin down an object in a laboratory 
requires a scale more suited to the mathematical and experimental styles of a "fact 
factory" which is used to theoretical and technical simplifications. These have split 
nature up into disciplines and, above all, have kept her isolated from the contagion 
of the realm of the so-called social sciences. What the new historiography has 
taught us about the Scientific revolution now echoes what the scientists of the third 
culture are demanding: to be in possession of tools in order to work with objects 
which cannot be created artificially, ¡n order later to manipulate them in the 
laboratory. So that in order to isolate them they have to operate as Galileo, 
Newton, Linnaeus or Lavoisier did: first, to imagine them as a synthesis of different 
traditions; second, to fix them by ad hoc experimental means developed in the 
laboratory; and third, to disseminate them by means of propaganda aimed at 
increasing their presence in the public awareness.127 It is far from easy, as science 
studies show, but the iconoclasts are in luck. Literature abounds, but few have 
shown such mastery as Steven Shapin,128 expert in the great superproductions of 
Hollywood's Golden Age, but who shows us a view of science and scientists which 
does not follow in the wake of Cecil B. de Mille but rather the models of Woody 
Alien or Robert Guediguian. And the change is as great as that which took place in 
the cinema, all that we lose in spectacle and glitz we gain in truthfulness and 
freshness. The actors are ordinary people who cook ordinary food, although they 
still hesitate about what spice to use for seasoning and sometimes they venture on 
vague projects. So are scientists also like us? Yes, and in two senses. First, 
because they are human beings; they live in society, they feel passions and they 
make lots of mistakes. But Shapin also draws a picture which, without detriment to 
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historical accuracy, is relevant to the reader who is trying to understand the world 
of today. The scientists of the 16th and 17th century are invited to join in as our 
contemporaries in this feast of words and gestures which we call culture.129 To be 
sure, they speak about their affairs, their world, their dreams, their favourite books 
and their contacts; but they speak our language, they know about our interests, 
they are not autistic. And they do indeed need the conversation we offer them. The 
image they have been landed with is uncomfortable, they wear grandioso clothes, 
they look like brains stuck onto a sphinx, and they don't want to waste any more of 
the life they have left in feeding our insatiable hunger for myths and legends. And 
they are quite right. 
This strategy was always plagued with controversy and theoretical or experimental 
difficulties. Looking for the protagonists of these procedures with Nanni Moretti's 
hand-held camera teaches us to see them smuggling instruments designed for 
other purposes, acting without a script, with histrionic gestures and with dynastic 
ambitions. What is new about the aims which are behind the third culture is that 
they are fusing together problems whose scientific and humanistic nature is no 
longer dual, as Snow describes the drama of our culture, but unique and 
indistinguishable. Systems as complex as the brain and the consciousness, matter 
and life, the biosphere and culture, are not pairs of independent problems, but are 
all subject to a common evolutionary process. And to think of them as 
interdependent we need a whole arsenal of new metaphors which will transform 
our culture into something hitherto unimaginable, and of course as revolutionary as 
the change which took place in the Renaissance.130 
And we are not only talking of books. Another of the characteristics of the third 
culture is that the frontiers between scientists and amateurs are breaking down 
more and more. The very notion of science and academia has become something 
too abstract or else too political and worldly. The reasonable thing is to talk of 
research, a term which simply describes a single activity which is not encumbered 
with dense clinging utopian or ideological values. To accentuate the contrasts, it 
seems that the commitment is no longer so much with truth as with the wish to 
make things work. Old-style scientists would measure and test the mind or the 
intelligence, while those of the third culture would try to make something that 
worked well, or seemed to. In order to answer the question of how the mind works, 
the solution which would meet with most approval would be to build something 
which tried to replicate it. And we could generalise this change of direction into all 
topics characteristic of the third culture, for the answers always take the form of 
new technologies. What is reality? What is life? What is consciousness? The third 
culture makes use of supercomputing and replies with artificial reality, artificial life 
and artificial consciousness. 
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For Popper science transcends culture. Something which Polanyi expressed more 
radically when he considered it the epitome of transculturalism, a production 
capable of overcoming the multiplicity of races and cultures. But what happens 
when tension arises between people of different levels of access to education, 
between rich and poor, between centre and fringe? Here Snow, fascinated like 
other armchair leftists by the Soviet education system, hesitates between sending 
an army of engineers to impose modernisation in all corners of the planet, and 
recruiting battalions of scientific teachers to banish the local culture. But all these 
points now seem archaic. Today the culture which transcends all others is 
technology. We are talking not of the missionary experts that Snow visualised in 
mid-century, but of the masses of Internet users. The PC is the greatest symbol of 
the third culture. More than a tool it is a destiny: its millennium lies in the promises 
of nanotechnology, and its acolytes keep swelling the ranks of the 
technopagans.131 
Computers, said MacLuhan, are LSD for the leaders of the New Economy. Their 
heaven ¡s in Silicon Valley and in innovation-oriented capital-intensive industries. 
Their spokespersons have no great respect for scientific credentials and rather 
favour free initiative and amateur-ism. Understanding is less important to them 
than innovation. Many of the protagonists make up a sort of pop science, full of 
people whose culture is their technology. It is the generation of the Nintendo or 
Tamagoshi kids: it is the generation of the nerd, a popular term to describe those 
eternal adolescents who dress without style, who can't get a girl and who are 
obsessed by computers, the noisiest electric guitars, and science - fiction B-
movies. Any teenager can get hold of a powerful PC and keep a virtual farm and 
develop software until he produces something never seen before. It was nerds who 
created the dinosaurs in Jurassic Park, inventing a whole virtual structure of bones 
and muscles under a simulated skin, which showed aspects of the movement of di-
nosaurs which no palaeontologist could ever have imagined. The nerd is an 
explosive hybrid born of the convergence between ease of access to Internet and 
the proliferation of unqualified experts who roam the net. And this is not a 
Hollywood scenario, and it is not just for "gringos" -for nerds are everywhere, they 
are an international phenomenon.132 
Their heroes are hackers, those computer pirates who, after a spectacular attack, 
are hired by some multinational for astronomical sums. The hackers respect 
nothing and nobody, they break into the Pentagon and shop with Bill Gates' credit 
card. With their home computers they laugh at official experts. Once again, 
laughter, only this time those who laugh are fans of Internet II, unclassifiable 
people with great influence. Even if history meant anything to them, they would 
admire neither New-ton nor Einstein. Perhaps their mythological hero would be 
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Edison, some-one without university degrees who improvised tools as he needed 
them and who, like a good nerd, had certain business ambitions. Edison did not 
stop to think of the possible perverse or wicked uses of his inventions. What 
concerned him was whether the gadgets worked, and incidentally to increase his 
income. 
 
 
Essential tension 
 
The sect of the Edisonians is forceful, but they would never manage to win the 
contest to nomínate the person of the century with which Time magazine 
welcomed the year 2000: the winner was Einstein. Fifty years before the 
Americans who took part in the same competition choose Roosevelt. A significant 
fact which emphasises the idea that scientists are special people and that even 
today they have greater credibility than politicians. Talking about science is not a 
recent fashion and rarely has a theory aroused such media enthusiasm as that of 
relativity. Its conclusions were as amazing and incomprehensible as those 
proposed by Newton. Is it acceptable for the same phenomenon to be described in 
a different way by two observers? We know that this is normal in human sciences 
and in café conversations, but the positivists led us to believe that science was 
different. Well yes, it happens, it is against common sense, but eppur si muove. 
For one you only need to stretch time and for the other to shrink longitudes. Many 
physicists hesitated, and it was some time before scientists admitted it to their 
canon. 
But where scientists feared to tread, artists rushed in. The former talked cautiously 
of space and time as mathematical variables included in equations explaining 
incomprehensible phenomena at the hand of Newton or MaxweII; the latter wanted 
relativity to be the exaltation of subjectivism, the final assault on the academic 
spirit, and the greatest Impetus to abstraction in painting, atonality in music, free 
verse in poetry and moral vagueness in politics. "A silo full of concentrated sin" 
was the verdict of one of the commentators worried at the end of civilisation 
portended by Einstein's ideas. Everyone had his say and few of them appeared to 
listen to what the wise man actually said. In a famous play by Tom Stoppard, a 
philosopher wonders "If you can no longer believe that a twelve-inch ruler is always 
a foot long, how can you be sure of things which are relatively less certain?". 
Einstein pro-tested at this polyphonic flood of banalities, but to no avail. The theory 
of relativity was a universal potion, to cure all ills, because now every-thing was 
relative. The image of the person carne before that of the scientist, and the more 
irony he heaped into his comments against so many charlatans and so many 
pedantic opportunists, the more brilliant he seemed. And relativity? Nothing, for it 
soon became clear that few were to be able to understand it. Further, such 
difficulty only served to make the myth more powerful, because the more 
inaccessible his ideas, the more undeniable was his brilliance.133  
Einstein got tired of correcting those who looked for the myth rather than his 
theories. And here we find another great joke. Einstein laughed at himself. There 
are few images more widely-known than that offered to the cameras on his 72nd 
birthday, with his tongue out and the look of a naughty schoolboy, framed by a 
great mass of unruly hair. He is making fun of himself. There is no hint of animosity 
between the actor and his audience. The fascination is mutual, but the script is 
well-known. The press still wants to overwork an image which wavers between 
distant sphinx and popular hero. Nobody wants to look for another piece of news, 
for Einstein is not a fashion: he is a necessary myth. No matter what he does, the 
reporters will not interpret his pose as a gesture of arrogant rejection but as further 
proof of his incomparable genius.134 
And before we end, we have another great burst of laughter, whose echoes can 
still be heard. Now, many centuries earlier, it is Democritus who is laughing. What 
is the matter with the venerable sage? Some apocryphal letters between the 
citizens of Abdera (Thrace), his native town and the great Hippocrates tell the 
story. They are very worried because their Democritus, their much-admired sage, 
laughs at every-thing, doesn't sleep, sings to himself at midnight, listens to the 
birds' song, wants to travel to the outer limits, declares that the air is full of 
shadowy figures. A misfortune which calls for a doctor's opinion, since it threatens 
to spread to other citizens. Hippocrates, continues the legend discovered by Littré, 
goes to the town and gives his diagnosis: "I do not think this is an illness: he has 
just had a surfeit of science, which is really only an excess in the eyes of ordinary 
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citizens". Splendid. If it were not for Einstein's clowning, this would be the 
antimodel. Now it is the scholar who laughs. He scorns human stupidity and, if he 
has with-drawn from what the people call the world, or life, it is to inhabit another 
more forceful and attractive. Here we have one of the scientist’s favourite images: 
the priesthood of truth, reclusion in the exclusive space of the laboratory.135 Galileo 
did the same after his conviction: he with-drew in order to write his finest works. 
And Cicero says that this was a characteristic of Archimedes' life: far from the 
image of an engineer concerned with practical matters, he shows us a timid 
watcher of the world and its secrets who was not even able to sense the danger he 
was in when the Romans overran his city. A mistake which cost him his life, but 
which elevated him to Parnassus. 
We began with a martyr and end with a madman. But we have also redeemed a 
good deal of laughter. What makes them laugh, what makes them die? Sometimes 
an excess of wisdom and always what they do not understand. Lavoisier, Galileo, 
Archimedes and Thales died in a reverie. Einstein, Voltaire and Democritus drifted 
towards disillusionment. Buffon and Brockman have an overdose of academia and, 
finally Mary Shelley and the woman of Thrace tremble with anxiety. Science is 
certainly special and all too often creates insuperable distances. The image of the 
two cultures is a recent illusion which hides a harsher reality: the schism between 
scholars and laymen. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
135 Bernardette Bensaude-Vincent, L’opinion publique et la science. A Chacun son ignorance, 
Sanofi-Synthélabo, Paris: 2000. 
